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I. INTRODUCTION OF PANEL
MR. DAVID C. SHORT**: The moderator is John R. Leath-
ers from Frost & Jacobs. John was a professor at the University
of Kentucky College of Law for a number of years and is
recognized nationally as an expert in legal ethics. He is assisted
today by Professor Rick Underwood, who is a colleague of mine
here on the faculty at the University of Kentucky. He has
published a book on legal ethics' and is Chairman of the Legal
Ethics Committee for the Kentucky Bar Association. I think you
are in for an interesting presentation and I am looking forward
to it myself. John?
MR. LEATHERS: Good morning. This is kind of a repeat of
something that we did back in the fall for the Mineral Law
Seminar. We have not changed the basic issues; we just changed
our way of presenting them a little bit.
We have a panel today of people from various areas of the
practice. Rick Underwood has already been introduced. Next to
him we have the Honorable Hank Graddy of Reeves & Graddy
in Versailles, Kentucky. He does a good deal of environmental
work-in particular, environmental concerns from the plaintiffs'
point of view.
Next to him we have Skip Stigger from Henderson, Ken-
tucky. He and his partner, Ben Cubbage, have an oil and gas
practice. And, let us see .... Who is missing over there?
MR. UNDERWOOD: Tom FitzGerald has not made it yet.
MR. LEATHERS: My friend, Donald Vish, from Brown, Todd
& Heyburn will be here directly.
And then next to him, we have Joe Zaluski from Wyatt,
Tarrant & Combs' Frankfort office.
And then, finally, we have Mr. Frank Dickerson from the
Department of Law for the Natural Resources & Environmental
Protection Cabinet.
These people will be commenting on the various problems
that we have put together.
The other thing about this method of presentation is that it
bears a good resemblance to what you do in law school. You
** Professor of Law and Director, Mineral Law Center, College of Law, University
of Kentucky.
R. UNDERWOOD & W. FORTUNE, TRIAL ETHICS (1988) (updated annually).
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put together hypothetical problems; you walk people through
hypothetical changes to explore the various facets of the prob-
lems. That has always seemed to me to be better than lecturing,
which, particularly in the area of ethics, sounds a good bit like
preaching. So we are going to start off with a problem that I
have prepared.
II. HYPOTHETICAL ETHICS PROBLEMS BASED ON MOVIE CLASS
AcTnoN
I had occasion in the last three weeks to see a movie that is
currently playing in the movie theaters, a movie called Class
Action.2 We were a little short of materials so I thought that
perhaps we might start with the scenario from the movie. If you
go see it, it is sort of ethical-violation-of-the-minute cinematog-
raphy. For those of you who are not familiar with the movie,
it is a variant of the Pinto litigation.' If you will remember, in
the Ford Pinto litigation there was a very famous memo that
was discovered concerning the location of the gas tank in Ford
Pintos. The memo was to the effect that the location of the gas
tank was likely to cause an explosion in rear-end collisions.
4
During the course of the Pinto litigation the memo was
uncovered.' It made a computation of the dollar amount that
would be required to relocate the gas tank, but then computed
the number of explosions that would occur as a result of not
relocating the gas tank, including the computation of what the
wrongful death damages would be and what the physical injury,
pain and suffering damages would be, and concluded that it was
cheaper to leave the gas tank where it was than to relocate it.6
Instead, they would just pay off the claims.
Class Action (20th Century Fox 1990).
There were many lawsuits throughout the United States in the 1970s regarding
a design defect in the Ford Pinto. The defect made the cars susceptible to fire if involved
in a rear-end collision. R. GOODMAN, AUTOMOBILE DESIGN LIABILITY § 3:5 (2d ed. 1983).
There was not a single class action suit against Ford, however, in regard to defects in
the Pinto fuel tank. See Id.
I In 1977, Mother Jones published an expose of Ford's knowledge regarding fuel
system safety in the Pinto. Citing internal company documents, the article revealed Ford
knew not only that a rear-end collision would rupture the fuel tank easily, but that the
problem could be prevented for less than $11 per vehicle. Dowie, Pinto Madness, 2
MOTHER JONES 18, 24 (Sept./Oct. 1977). Lee lacocca, then a top executive at Ford, was
also quoted as saying "safety doesn't sell." id. at 22.
See supra note 4.
See supra note 4.
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The movie Class Action is a soap opera version of that in
which Gene Hackman plays the central character. He is a plain-
tiffs' lawyer representing a class of persons regarding explosions
in a fictitious automobile. They believe that the gas tank has
caused the explosion of these automobiles, so it is a products
liability kind of thing. On the defense side is a large corporate
law firm that represents the manufacturer. Included on the de-
fense team is an associate who is Gene Hackman's daughter
7
and they have all this dramatic confrontation in the family
context.
But putting aside the soap opera ramifications of it, some
really incredible things happen in the course of this movie, all
of which point up ethical problems that occur in litigation gen-
erally. And certainly you can see it happening in environmental
litigation. So what I thought we would do is walk through this
scenario.
What happens here is that you have the plaintiffs, whose
theory is that the location of the gas tank is inherently danger-
ous, and they are seeking proof to that effect. They make a
request for production of documents related to that particular
vehicle. In the course of her investigation, the young associate
[for the defense] talks to one of the people who worked on the
design team. He, in the course of talking to her, says, "Well,
if you want to know about the gas tank, why don't you read
my memo? I called it the 'depth charge."' He discovered in the
course of experimentation that when making a left turn so that
the left turn signal was illuminated, if the vehicle was hit from
the rear, it would explode. They did a computation of how many
explosions they would likely have over the life of that vehicle. I
think they computed 158 or 159 such explosions. Coincidentally,
there are 156 people in the class, in the class action that is
involved in this movie.
What happens is the young woman discovered from the
scientist that such a memo exists. She then goes through the
files and finds it and reads it. It says exactly what he told her.
Among the people who would have seen that memo at that point
7 Compare MODEL RuLss OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.8(i) (1991) [herein-
after MODEL RUias], which provides: "A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent,
child, sibling or spouse shall not represent a client in a representation directly adverse
to a person who the lawyer knows is represented by the other lawyer except upon consent
by the client after consultation regarding the relationship."
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in time is the mid-level partner in her law firm, who has been
the billing partner on this corporate account for a long period
of time. He was the billing partner at the time this was going
on, so he was in the consultation chain as this was happening.
She removes the memo from the files of the corporation and
takes it back to her office. She makes a copy, which she puts
in a desk drawer. She then takes the other copy and goes to see
the mid-level partner. They then go to see a senior-level partner.
8
They are, of course, disturbed by the memo, as you can imagine.
What then happens is they discuss what to do about the memo.
And what they ultimately conclude is that they will produce
documents which have been requested by the plaintiffs in the
case and they will produce the document, the one that has been
prepared by the scientist, but they will bury it in 50 zillion
documents that have related to all the work that that guy has
done in the 30-odd years that he worked for the company; and
it would be like hunting, literally, for a needle in a haystack for
the plaintiffs' team.9 And so you see them, then, getting ready
to produce all those documents.
Let us begin with that particular topic. Is that something
that can ethically be done by an attorney in that particular
context? The decision is made by the young woman, the mid-
level partner, and the senior-level partner in the law firm.
So let us start, perhaps, with Mr. Stigger. Mr. Stigger, what
do you think about that particular tactic of producing the doc-
uments in that fashion?
MR. STIGGER: Well, John, without getting into what the
moral issue is, I do not see that there has been a violation of
the professional responsibility of the lawyers or the law firm
involved on that. Certainly, all those documents are going to be
presented and that is among the documents to be produced. I
do not see that they have breached their obligation.
Compare MoDn. RuLEs, Rule 5.2, which provides:
(a) A lawyer is bound by the rules of professional conduct notwithstanding
that the lawyer acted at the direction of another person. (b) A subordinate
lawyer does not violate the rules of professional conduct if that lawyer
acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an
arguable question of professional duty.
9 This is called a "file dump." Other terms from around the country include
"shuffling," "concentration," and the "mixed cocktail." See UNDERWOOD & FORTUNE
supra note 1, § 6.5.4.
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MR. LEATHERS: All right. Let us think about this. How
does this interplay with the Rules of Civil Procedure that relate
to production of documents? You have a production request
that is specifically directed towards any memorandum prepared
by any of the design team, including this guy, on this vehicle.
Do you sufficiently comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure
when you produce, in that particular fashion, his documents
going back 30-plus years?
What do you think about that, Mr. Zaluski?
MR. ZALUSKI: I would say that the intention is obviously to
hide the memo. If the expectation of the people producing them
is it is so well buried that they are not going to find it, then I
think we have a problem. I think they have technically complied
with our rules of conduct in that they have produced it. But,
again, having not seen the movie, John, if it is so well buried
that there is no expectation of someone actually finding it, I
think we have a problem.
MR. LEATHERS: In the movie, they have delivered to plain-
tiffs' counsel bankers' boxes full of documents that fill a me-
dium-sized U-Haul truck. So there would be in the tens of
thousands of documents in there. And what they have done,
rather cleverly, it seems to me, is change the way those would
normally be indexed. They eventually generate a manifest, but
they have changed the way that would be done, and that also
confuses things. They have not produced them in a chronological
fashion. So what about that? Hank, what do you think about
that?
MR. GRADDY: The matter that I would add is, while I would
look for ways to find that the defense firm violated a rule, I
would have to agree with the answers that have been provided.
It seems like that there is-literal compliance, but it does seem
like plaintiffs' counsel also has the opportunity to seek some
assistance from the court to get a more meaningful or direct
answer. If I received a U-Haul-It, I think my first response
would be to request assistance of the court to get a direct answer
to my question: Do you have a memo, concerning this particular
vehicle, by this witness? If so, help me find it.
1991-92]
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I think this is a burdensome response and hopefully the court
will be sympathetic in recognizing it is a burdensome delivery
by the defendant.
MR. LEATHERS: Now, as a matter of civil procedure, one
may produce documents either in a form responsive to the
request which has been received, organized in that particular
fashion, or in the manner in which they are kept in the ordinary
course of business. So I think one should ask at the outset of
looking at this particular document production, whether or not
it even complies with that particular provision of the rules. 0
And they would be very hard pressed, it seems to me, to say
that their own, the law firm's, organization of those documents
is in the manner in which they were kept in the ordinary course
of business. So they have got a problem, I think, at the outset
of that.
Let us go on from there, though, and talk about the ethical
considerations of it. When the boxes, a huge number of boxes,
come to the plaintiffs' firm, they instantly say, "They're hiding
something." They do not know what.... They do not know
which of their production requests has triggered this particular
response. And so it is very hard for them to figure out exactly
what to look for or what to request. They do not know which
ones to hit out of that.
Let us take up Rule 3.2," however, of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, which is: "Expediting Litigation: A lawyer shall
make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the
interest of the client." Now, in those particular circumstances,
is the lawyer who is making the production expediting the liti-
gation? What do you think about that? Mr. Vish?
MR. VISH: No.
MR. LEATHERS: Why not?
10 See FED. R. Cv. P. 34(b); UNDERWOOD & FORTUNE supra note 1, at 249: "All
too frequently, counsel for the party aggrieved by these tactics is simply unaware that
the rules condemn such practices and contain blackletter authority for a remedy."
See also MODEL RuLES, Rules 3.4(c) and (d), which provide:
IA lawyer shall not] (c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules
of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no
valid obligation exists; (d) in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery
request or fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally
proper discovery request by an opposing party.
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MR. VISH: Well, an over-compliance like that, John, is no
compliance at all.
MR. LEATHERS: Why do you think that is not consistent
with the duty of expediting litigation?
MR. VISH: Well, there is no compliance at all with the request
to produce documents if one arranges affairs in such a way that
no meaningful transmission of information can occur.
MR. LEATHERS: What do you make of the provision that
says, "consistent with the interests of the client?" Now, if I
produced that memo in such a way that they instantly know
what it is, is that consistent with protecting the interests of the
client?
MR. VISH: If the rules say that they are entitled to that, then
you must hand it over. 2 I do not think that you can construe
the interests of the client so broadly as to withhold documents,
certainly. And I think that presenting documents in such a way
as to conceal their contents or even conceal their identity is not
complying with the rules.
MR. LEATHERS: I will tell you what the comment says on
this particular aspect of the Rules. It says: "Dilatory practices
bring the administration of justice into disrepute." It goes on
to say: "The question is whether a competent lawyer acting in
good faith would regard the course of action as having some
substantial purpose other than delay.'1 3 Put against that partic-
ular backdrop, this particular production technique seems to me
to be somewhat dubious. Now, on the other hand, those sort of
dragnet requests for production of documents suit themselves to
these kinds of responses.14 And so it may say something to those
who make those document production requests, as well, to be
more particularized. One of the things that certainly does not
expedite litigation is the huge amount of needless discovery that
12 See MODEL RULES, Rule 3.4(d).
" MODEL RULES, Rule 3.2 comment.
14 See UNDERWOOD & FORTUNE supra note 1, §§ 6.4 [Excessive demands] and 6.5.2
[Insufficient and artful responses].
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goes on in very many cases. And so all of that seems to me to
play into this.
Now, what happens in this scenario next, having watched
them load this huge group of documents, is that this young
woman looks at the manifest and realizes that, despite the agree-
ment among herself, the senior partner and the mid-level partner
that this document will be produced and buried in the volumi-
nous production but that, in point of fact, this document is not
in there at all. She confirms from tht boxes that it is not in
there. She confirms from the manifest that it is not in there.
And now she has a very difficult problem, does she not, con-
cerning what she is to do about the fact that the document
apparently has disappeared in this particular process? Now, what
do you think, Mr. Dickerson, ought to be her course of conduct
at that point in time?
MR. DICKERSON: I think she would have the obligation to-
she was a participant, though, with the supervisor."5
MR. LEATHERS: She was a participant in the agreement to
produce the document in a particular way. She has no knowledge
that anybody has decided to destroy the document, but now she
knows it is missing. What to do?
MR. DICKERSON: Was it intentionally withdrawn from the
package?
MR. LEATHERS: One would infer that because the manifest
is computer-generated and there is a blank where that particular
document should have been. So one would infer that, in the
computer run-out of the manifest, somebody had not only pulled
the document, they had deleted it from the computer run of the
manifest.
MR. DICKERSON: I think her initial responsibility, assuming
that she is in the firm, is that she needs to contact her supervisor
and report that back to him. That may exculpate her from that
point forward. But to carry it on, if it is missing and she has
knowledge that it was intentionally withheld, then, I think she
needs to bring that to the attention of the other members of the
" MODEL RuLEs, Rules 5.1 and 5.2.
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firm so they may take appropriate action. It would be a clear
violation to be withholding evidence that was obtainable.
MR. LEATHERS: Okay. Let us begin with what is wrong with
the document being missing. Is that the beginning problem to
be analyzed? What is it that is wrong about that? Let us start
with that. Joe, what do you think?
MR. ZALUSKI: It is clearly in violation of the discovery rules.
I mean, it is covered by the request for documents, I assume,
clearly. This is a document generated concerning the gas tank.
So we have a problem there. They certainly have knowledge of
the document, which makes it even worse. This is not an over-
sight. 6 They know the document and they have excluded it from
the discovery process.
MR. LEATHERS: She knows that she did not do it, but
something has happened.
MR. ZALUSKI: I do not think it makes any difference if she
knows it is supposed to be there. She knows of its existence. It
is not there. She needs to take steps under Rule 5.2.17 And she
has the same responsibility as the senior counsel to comply with
the rules. And she has got to take steps to find out why it is
not there, if indeed it was an oversight, which would be hard to
believe in this scenario, and produce it.
MR. LEATHERS: What the Rules of Conduct say on this is
that-and this is Rule 3.4(a)-a lawyer shall not "unlawfully
obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter,
destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential
evidentiary value." Now, that is a good deal broader than what
we are talking about here. Here you have something that cer-
tainly has potential evidentiary value and it is already subject to
a production of documents request. So that if somebody has
done this, if a lawyer has violated that particular provision of
this rule, in addition to having problems under the discovery
'1 See MODEL RULES, Rules 3.4(c) and (d) cited in note 11, supra.
' MODEL RULES, Rule 5.2(a) provides: "A lawyer is bound by the rules of pro-
fessional conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another
person."
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rules, concerning the response to the document production re-
quest, which they are ultimately going to have to sign and file
as well. So that is the problem from her point of view. What
about her going back to her office and getting her copy of the
document and putting it into the materials? What do you think
about that, Fitz?
MR. FITZGERALD: That is part of her problem. Part of the
problem is that she is a junior attorney in a firm and the first
thing she is going to do is prepare the letter of resignation and
put it on the desk before she goes and talks to the senior partner
and says, "By the way, this is missing." The senior partner
says, "I know it's missing; keep your mouth shut." What do
you do then? There is no Nuremberg defense to being just ajunior subordinate in a law firm. 8 You have an independent
obligation, I would think, to raise it with the client because the
client may not be aware of the fact that it's been concealed.
And, then, you have an obligation to inform the opposing
counsel and the court if you can't internally resolve it.19
MR. LEATHERS: Okay. So at this point in time, you think
she has an obligation to do something. Would it satisfy you if
she simply goes and gets her own document and puts it into the
documents to be produced so that now it is in the same scenario
as before? Is it going to be produced?
MR. FITZGERALD: That is obviously an alternative. It will
have practical ramifications with the firm, any of these things.
And the question is whether the firm is wise enough to realize
that this kind of ploy puts them in great jeopardy, not only in
the instant situation, but in terms of their reputation. Hopefully
it would be resolved internally just by going to the senior partner
and saying, "This is a really high risk, a very foolish gamble."
MR. LEATHERS: All right. Now, let us take it a step further,
then, because I think the things that you are saying are quite
correct. Let us go up a step. She goes back to her office and
" MODEL RULES, Rule 5.2(a) Comment [1). Numbering for Comments to the Model
Rules follows T. MORGAN AND R. ROTUNDA, SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY (1990).
11 Compare A.B.A. Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal
Op. 1458 (1980); New York City Op. 1990-2; Pennsylvania Op. 89-249 (1989).
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her copy is gone, taken from her desk. Then she goes to the
mid-level partner, who has been the billing partner on this large
corporate account for a very long period of time, and he does
indeed say, "Shut up. Sit down. Now, if you want to have a
career in this law firm, this is what we're going to do." Because
that client accounted for, I think they say in the movie, 25 or
26 percent of the firm's income during the prior year. Now,
where does she go from there? What do you think about that,
Don? Remember, there is another level in this partnership. She
was originally in a meeting and with a senior-level partner who
knew about this. What do you think?
MR. VISH: I think eventually, John, she is headed toward the
court if she cannot get relief within the organization herself,
then, that is ultimately where she is headed. But I think until
she has exhausted all remedies within the organization, she's still
within the organization.
MR. LEATHERS: Can she simply obey his order? She wants
to be a partner in a "skin them, catch them, lynch them" law
firm. And she knows this is a bad career move for her to do
anything about it. Can she just say "no"? What do the rules
say about that? What do you think, Hank?
MR. GRADDY: She is bound by the rules and she has an
obligation not to violate 3.410 and ultimately 3.3, Candor Toward
the Tribunal, and not to assist in fraudulent activities. So she
cannot hide behind her mid-level, low-level ranking and say,
"They're in charge. They will take the heat." In 5.2, it clearly
obligates her to comply with all the rules."
MR. LEATHERS: The Rules do say in Rule 5.2 that following
orders is not a defense for violation of the Rules. So she has
her own independent responsibility now. She knows the docu-
ment has been withheld and destroyed by a mid-level partner.
She cannot simply obey his order safely. She is now on the hook
as well.
MODEL Ru.s, Rule 3.4(c) and (d) cited in note I I, supra.
' See supra note 8.
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Now, you could have had still another problem, of course,
if you are in a jurisdiction, I take it, that has a "squeal rule,"
'22
which requires you to disclose violations of the Rules and so
forth. But in Kentucky, as you may know, we do not have that
particular version in our rule.
So she goes now to the senior-level partner in the law firm.
And let us suppose that what he says is, "I don't want to hear
about that. Don't tell me anything that's going on there." Now,
what is she going to do, Joe?
MR. ZALUSKI: I think, again, all the rules apply to her. I
would head over to the corporate body itself and meet with the
highest officer I could start with, I assume. And as a part of
the conspiracy your next scenario is, the president of the com-
pany says, "I've dealt with senior partners. We have to figure
it out. Go home." I suspect then she could certainly try to see
the board. Barring that, to get back to what Don said, she
should head to the courthouse. She goes through the same
progression as senior management would.
MR. LEATHERS: What do you think about it, Rick? What
is her obligation to the court at this point?
MR. UNDERWOOD: Well, I think you have her going through
the law firm which, as Tom says, is the logical thing. And then
I think that if her firm is not going to comply, her response
should be to terminate her relationship with the firm. The inter-
esting question now is, does she have an obligation to make
some disclosure to the court or the other party or all of that?
And I would think that this would be something that should be
brought to the attention of the client-go through the client
The "squeal rule" is also known as the "snitch rule." MODEL RULES, Rule
8.3(a) and (c) provide:
(a) A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a
violation of the rules of professional conduct that raises a substantial
question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer
in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority. (c)This
rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule
1.6.
This provision was deleted by the Supreme Court of Kentucky when it approved the
adoption of the Commonwealth's version of the Model Rules. See Ky. RULES OF
PROFESSIONM. CONDUCT Rule 3.130 of RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT, contained within
KY. RuLEs oF COURT (West 1991).
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before disclosures are made and you can walk the client up
through the 1.13 chain. 2 I am not sure once you are out of the
representation and have left that with the firm, that you do have
a disclosure obligation, unless it flows from the fact that you
were somehow still before the court and would be subject to the
obligation to disclose under the discovery rules. What I am
saying is that once the lawyer is no longer representing the client,
she does not know for sure that fraud is going to be committed
or does not know-has not offered the evidence yet and has not
responded, I am not sure there is a disclosure obligation.
4
MR. VISH: There may not be.
MR. UNDERWOOD: I think it is a tough question.
MR. VISH: That is the toughest question. There may be an
obligation to withdraw from employment and not say anything.
MR. LEATHERS: It is a pretty strong career move. She is, in
this movie, five, six years deep and has been told that she is
probably going to become the youngest partner in this big cor-
porate law firm. It was a real honor to be named to this
corporate team .... So she is in a tough spot. Don, what do
you think about the scenario of up through the corporate chain?
Rick said a minute ago, up through the corporate chain in
accordance with Rule 1.13.21 What Rick, I think, is getting at
there is that it is the corporation that is the client. Not even the
president of that corporation-when he says, go up through the
corporate chain, it would be, first, your contact-whoever is
running the litigation on that end. Above that, to whoever is his
11 See MODEL RuLas, Rule 1.6, Comment [151 (Withdrawal]. Model Rule 1.13(b)
provides:
If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other
person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act
or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation
of law which reasonably might be imputed to the organization, the lawyer
shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organi-
zation. ... Such measures may include ... referring the matter to higher
authority in the organization including, if warranted by the seriousness of
the matter, referral to the highest authority that can act in behalf of the
organization....
' See New York City Op. 1990-2; A.B.A. Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility Informal Op. 1458 (1980).
" See supra note 23.
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supervisor. Then maybe to the president or CEO and finally to
the board, looking to make the client conscious of what the
ramifications may be of this, should that be disclosed. Now,
that is pretty strong too because she is not the billing partner or
anything else. She is in a tough spot. What do you think about
that scenario, Don?
MR. VISH: I agree with that scenario. I think if you exhaust
remedies in the firm, then I think you go to the client. Then if
you do not get satisfactory results there, then you have reached
a very difficult point, which Rick identifies. I am sure you must
resign if you are on the pleadings. I am not so sure you must
disclose. But I endorse going through the client hoops.
From the standpoint of the government, there is a very
interesting wrinkle to this, John, and that is, government em-
ployees, let us say, working for the executive branch, after they
have exhausted their remedies, can they go over to the legislative
branch and talk to Congress? Under the Code, the model rules
that Kentucky has adopted, that is indeed the obligation, because
the Code defines the attorney for the government as the govern-
ment as a whole. The D.C. bar rejected that test and said that
a government lawyer's client is the specific agency;26 but in the
case of a corporation, it is ultimately the board of directors.
MR. LEATHERS: Now, what happens in the scenario in the
movie is that she basically takes to her bed in a depression for
several days and, ultimately, she finds herself at trial. And so
this huge piece of litigation has moved quickly. And among the
things that she has been assigned to do by the corporate law
firm in the course of this litigation is what we will call a hatchet
job on opposing witnesses. They have a couple of times tested
her stomach for doing something really bad. And early on, you
see her totally dismember a witness in a deposition, calling back
to mind the psychic trauma of the loss of his wife and children,
all of which leaves him in tears and not willing to go forward
with anything. So you know that she has the stomach, truly, for
whatever it is that needs to be done. When the senior partner
says to her, "Can you do what needs to be done with the scientist
in this litigation when he takes the stand," and she says, "Yes,
I can do it," you know that she is going to do it.
See also Federal Bar Assoc. Op. 73-1 (1973); D. C. Bar Op. 148 (1985).
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What is interesting is that, on the witness stand in the liti-
gation, testifying for the plaintiff, is the scientist. And he testifies
about what he called the "depth charge," and says that, yes, it
was brought to the attention of persons in the company through
a memo which he wrote, but there is no such memo now known
to exist. She now takes him on, on the witness stand, knowing
that he is testifying truthfully that there is such a memo and
that the company was aware of it, by attacking his credibility:
"Did you write a memo on the 1991 Pup Mobile," or whatever
other project. She just selectively picked projects back through
his 30-year history, to say, "Did you do this? Did you do that?"
She finally gets him to the point that he has said, yes, he
remembers this project number very well. She gets him to the
point he does not remember his telephone number and he does
not remember his birthday. She does, really, an excellent job of
doing exactly what it was that senior counsel wanted her to do.
And they are all beaming at her pridefully from the defense
table in this particular instance.
Let us comment upon that particular tactic on her part,
knowing that his testimony is truthful. Can she legitimately
attack him on those grounds, leaving with the court and the
jury the suggestion that he is not testifying truthfully?" Is that
a fair tactic on her particular part? What do you think about
that?
Hank, what do you think?
MR. GRADDY: Well, I think that goes back to 3.3, Candor
Toward the Tribunal. It seems to me that there is an over-
arching obligation of a lawyer to reach toward truthfulness. And
I think that she is violating the requirements of that rule.
MR. LEATHERS: Look at the specific provisions, though. It
is very interesting. Here, you need to make a fine legal argument.
It says "The lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement
of material fact or law." 2 8 She did not make any statements.
She asked the guy questions, which leave you with a particular
impression. "[The lawyer shall not knowingly] . . . fail to dis-
close a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary
" See UNDERWOOD & FORTUNE supra note 1, § 12.3 [Cross-examining the truthful
witness].
" MODEL RULES, Rule 3.3(a)(1).
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to avoid a fraud being perpetrated upon the tribunal. ' 29 She
never attacks the guy directly about the memo, to say to him,
"Aren't you wrong? Isn't it true there, really, wasn't any such
memo? You just imagined that." She simply leaves you with
that impression, based upon her skillful examination of him.
"[The lawyer shall not knowingly] . . . offer evidence that the
lawyer knows to be false." ' 30 She has not offered any evidence.
She cross-examined the witness. She asked him questions, and
it is true, he does not remember his birthday, he does not
remember his telephone number. What about that? Is she being
candid to tribunal under those circumstances when she does that
with the witness? What do you think, Joe?
MR. ZALUSKI: I think this is a matter of degree. I think we
all do this sort of thing to witnesses on the stand to some extent
to test their knowledge or how competent they are, how well
qualified they are, et cetera. So, again, I think it is a matter of
degree. You used the term "repugnant," which is used in 1.16.1
I don't know if you are headed in that direction or not. If she
being forced to do something to destroy somebody, and I sup-
pose the extent-here, according to Rick-is it personally repug-
nant, not repugnant to the firm? Apparently, nothing is repugnant
to this particular firm. She could bow out from her representa-
tion. But this testing this fellow in a trial this big, this many
witnesses, I suppose, this many dollars, testing this guy as far
as she can test him is reasonable. If the court let it go and there
is not an objection to badgering this witness or a violation of
the court's rules, I would let her go. I do not have a problem
with it.
MR. LEATHERS: Fitz, what do you think?
MR. FITZGERALD: Are we assuming that the other side has
the memo?
MR. LEATHERS: They do not.
" MODEL RuLEs, Rule 3.3(a)(2).
" MODEL RuLEs, Rule 3.3(a)(4).
" MODEL RuLEs, Rule 1.16(b)(3) provides: "[A] lawyer may withdraw from rep-
resenting a client if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on
the interests of the client, or if ... a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the
lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent."
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MR. FITZGERALD: Do they know of its existence?
MR. LEATHERS: We do not know that at this point in time.
They have been told of its existence and the witness has testified
that it exists, but no one has a copy. And they are making-as
you would imagine, the plaintiffs' lawyer is making a big deal
out of: This guy is right; there is a memo and they have de-
stroyed it or something has happened to it. They are getting the
mileage that they can out of it, but it is not the same. We know,
from the contents of the memo, that really having that document
would be a killer.
MR. FITZGERALD: What happened during discovery? Have
they asked for the memo and the memo has not been produced?
I am just trying to think what scenario we're working under.
MR. LEATHERS: They were going to bury it up, and then
ultimately it was not even produced in that fashion, so that the
plaintiffs' team has never seen it.
MR. FITZGERALD: Well, assuming that-and we have kind
of assumed that she has gotten past the hurdle of not having
unlawfully failed to disclose or hidden evidence, destroyed, con-
cealed, which is her obligation, you know, in the first instance
before you can get to trial, under [Model Rule] 3.4.12 Assuming
all of that, if she is not making a false statement3 or alluding
to facts that are not in evidence 4 or some of the other things
2 MODEL RuLEs, Rule 3.4(a) provides: "A lawyer shall not .. . unlawfully obstruct
another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy, or conceal a document
or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist
another person to do any such act."
33 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. See also MODEL RuLEs, Rule 4.1
Comment [1] which provides:
A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a client's
behalf, but generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party
of relevant facts. A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates
or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is false.
Misrepresentations can also occur by failure to act.
' MODEL RuLEs, Rule 3.4(e). The rule provides:
A lawyer shall not ... in trial allude to any matter that the lawyer does
not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admis-
sible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when
testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a
cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the
guilt or innocence of an accused.
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that are prohibited, I think the credibility, the memory of the
witness is fair game, as distasteful as that may be. I mean, there
is a line that you cross where you actually, intentionally mislead
the tribunal by assuming facts that are not going to be presented,
or that you knowingly allude to matters that are not relevant.
But beyond that, I think that testing his credibility-if what is
at issue is his memory of the memo and the circumstances
surrounding either the testing or the production of the memo,
then, I think that is fair game.
MR. LEATHERS: She wants to leave the tribunal with the
inference that this guy is wrong and that he did never write any
such memo. A guy who cannot remember his own telephone
number or his own birthday could easily be mistaken and think
that he put something in writing when, in fact, he did not. That
is the inference she wants to leave with the tribunal. Is that a
meritorious position for her to take? Is there anything under the
[Model] Rules that prevents her from doing that? In that regard,
consider [Model] Rule 3.1, which has to do with meritorious
claims and contentions. Focus on this language: "The lawyer
shall not"-we will skip a section-"controvert an issue therein,
unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous." Has
she knowingly controverted something when she knows there is
not a good faith basis to controvert it? When I saw that, that
is what occurred to me.
As you see, I think there is a divergence of opinion here,
but what I wanted to do with this particular hypothetical was
differentiate between her conduct in the pretrial discovery sort
of setting-and even pre-deposition setting may be different
from when you actually get into depositions-and then finally
when you get in front of the trier of fact. There are shadings
of the degree to which she may or may not be misleading the
tribunal as you shade off from early discovery, down through
the jury in the box ready to be deciding this particular case. So
she does her job. This guy is hurt very badly by this, but the
focus has begun to be, was there or was there not such a memo?
Now, plaintiffs' counsel does a very interesting thing. He
calls mid-level partner as a witness. Mid-level partner is on the
defense team. He is seated at defense table. And the reason he
wants to call him is to ask him: "Was there or was there not
such a memo? You were the billing partner during that era. You
would have been consulted if there was anything big like this
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going on. Do you know whether or not there was such a memo?"
What about calling that guy as a witness? What do you think
about that, Rick?
MR. UNDERWOOD: Well, you should not call someone sim-
ply for tactical reasons or to unfairly force them to assert a
privilege, but it seems to me that your clever plaintiffs' lawyer
now knows that there has been wrongdoing and has justification
for calling the witness, and it is brilliant. The bad guys are now
in a terrible position. The problem the plaintiffs' lawyer is going
to have-I think they could probably justify it in this case-but
they are going to have to convince the court. The court is going
to be shocked: "What do you mean, call the lawyer as a witness
in the case?" The other side is going to blow all kinds of smoke.
But I think this case is getting real interesting.
And if I were the judge, I would insist that the plaintiffs'
lawyer explain to me and make a showing: number one, why it
is not tactical; number two, that they have a good faith basis
for believing that there is an exception to the attorney/client
privilege." And if they make a convincing showing, I believe if
I were the judge-of course, thank God, I am not-I think I'd
have some fun with this.
MR. LEATHERS: What do you think about that, Don, a
defense lawyer on the defense team called as a witness by the
plaintiff?
MR. VISH: I do not think he can testify without the showing
that Rick has just mentioned.
MR. LEATHERS: If the guy serves as a witness, Rick, do you
think he is thereafter disqualified from serving as counsel on the
defense team?
MR. UNDERWOOD: Well, you have two issues here. One
point is, if the showing is made-and I would insist it be made-
I think we are all on the same wavelength. First of all, assuming
you get over attorney/client privilege-and that could be com-
11 Compare Shelton v. American Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323, 1327 (8th Cir.
1986); UNDERWOOD & FORTUNE supra note 1, § 6.4.8 (Attorney depositions).
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plicated in this case, but I assume we are over it and the evidence
that the lawyer is competent. A lawyer's testimony is competent
evidence, even if there is a violation of lawyer/witness rule .
6
Now, I suppose your technical question is since the lawyer is in
the case as a witness, should the firm withdraw from the case?
And, of course, we all know that is the rule." But so many
things have now happened in this case. The defense has now
lost miserably. The plaintiffs' lawyer should be jubilant-that
the business of whether the lawyer ought to continue is so
technical-the point is that it would no longer be interesting
compared to some of the other things that are happening.
MR. LEATHERS: That may not be a great difficulty, because
mid-level partner has been sort of sitting on the sidelines in the
defense.
MR. UNDERWOOD: Yes.
MR LEATHERS: Primarily, the associate has been carrying
the ball. They are getting good mileage out of her in this par-
ticular instance. Senior counsel is at counsel table with them.
And so the loss of one lawyer might not make a significant
difference.
MR. UNDERWOOD: Yes. I think the question is not so much
should that lawyer continue to play a dual role, which again we
are in the middle of a case that is somewhat academic, but: Can
the other people in the firm continue? And we have a modifi-
cation in the new rule that, theoretically, allows a member of
the firm to testify and allows other people to play the game.
But here that might not work. You might not- be able to escape
theoretical imputed disqualification because I gather the witness'
testimony will at least be perceived to be in conflict with the
client. So that's what, 3.7? You tell me, 3.7(b) or something like
that?
38
Waltzer v. Transidyne Gen. Corp., 697 F.2d 130 (6th Cir. 1983).
" MODEL Rutas, Rule 3.7 provides: "A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in
which another lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless





MR. LEATHERS: Well, the guy takes the witness stand. The
court says, "Yes, on this particular narrow question, I will allow
him to testify. Was there or was there not such a memo?" The
plaintiffs' lawyer does a terrible job examining this witness. The
witness is evasive. He never really says, "Was there or was there
not a memo?" What he says is, "Why would there have been
such a thing?" He evades every way in the world there is. And
you keep waiting for somebody to say: "Judge, would you
instruct the witness to answer yes or no, was there or was there
not a memo?" And so he has testified and you are left unre-
solved. I am waiting for the guy to perjure himself. Right?
What happens then is the most amazing thing, however. The
young woman cross examines him and she gives him a big smile
and says, "Just so the jury will understand fully that we are not
trying to conceal anything, would you please tell them, was there
or was there not a memo?"
Whereupon, mid-level partner takes it like a fish to the bait
and says, "No, there was not." Now, he has just perjured
himself. Right? Now, what are her obligations under those par-
ticular circumstances? He has perjured himself on what has
become the central focus of the case: A memo which disclosed
to them the danger of this particular automobile.
What does she do under that particular circumstance, Mr.
Dickerson?
MR. DICKERSON: She probably needs to get hold of you
[her own defense counsel] at that point. I think I would, if I
were her .... [S]he probably needs to call a recess and she needs
to get with that witness and say, "Look, we've got to rehabilitate
you in some fashion here. You've just committed perjury." If
he refuses, then I think she has to take the matter to the court.
MR. LEATHERS: It is interesting. The problem now is that
she has knowingly offered false evidence to the court, specifically
perjured evidence. Right? She has knowledge of the commission
of a crime that occurred right there in the courtroom, for one
thing. She has probably committed it. She may have suborned
perjury herself. What is she to do under these circumstances?
The rules are very interesting concerning what to do about false
evidence. 9 And as Mr. Dickerson suggested, her starting place
" MODEL RULES, Rule 3.3(a)(4) provides: "A lawyer shall not knowingly ... offer
evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence
and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures."
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is probably to talk to the witness. But will that be effective in
this particular instance? She and the witness have exchanged
glances on the witness stand that tells they both know very well
what it was that just happened. He understood what answer he
was to give, that no, there was no such memo, and he does it.
So where to go from there? Where do you go from there,
Mr'. Stigger?
MR. STIGGER: Well, I think, John, that the first thing you
do is you ask for a recess and you get the mid-level partner who
was on the stand. And I think you tell him that he has committed
perjury and that she is under an obligation to get that testimony
corrected in the record. And if he is unwilling to do that, then
she needs to let him know in no uncertain terms that she is
going to fulfill her obligation and go to the court, if necessary.
Now, John, I think this gets back a little bit when they are
talking about that memo that disappeared. I think had she gone
to the law firm and gone to the mid-level or to the senior partner,
if necessary, and said, "Furthermore, if that memo does not
show up in those documents that are going to be produced, I
am going to go to the court because I am not going to be a
party to the fraud." And I think that would have stopped it
effectively right there.
MR LEATHERS: I concur. This whole movie, in my view, as
I saw it, should have ended when she realized the document had
been destroyed. I think that sidetracks everything that occurs
thereafter, if she does her duty. But the problem is, she has a
tremendous amount of pressure on her. She is in a circumstance,
quite frankly, where that is a career-terminating move on her
part. It has been made clear to her that it is career terminating.
So she is under tremendous stress to go the other way. That
creates this dramatic scenario.
But, Mr. Stigger I think is entirely correct that that is what
stops all of this early on.
Now, things have gone from bad to worse for her. Now,
perjured testimony is in front of the court. She says to the guy,
"Correct it." He is not going to correct it and she knew he was
not going to correct it; she helped him to offer it. Now, what
is she to do? Assume that she says, "Oh, gee, maybe I'd better
try to get out of this scenario." What does she do under these
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circumstances? To whom does she go after that? The senior
partner sat right there when she asked the mid-level partner the
question; and he, too, knows that the answer was false because
he has discussed with mid-level partner the fact that the memo
exists. He has obligations as well. What does she do under these
circumstances?
What do you think about it, Don?
MR. VISH: Well, now, unlike earlier, where, as Rick had said,
I could not determine whether she had an obligation to just
withdraw or withdraw and disclose, here I am certain that she
is headed toward a duty to disclose.
MR. LEATHERS: What can she do before she gets to that
point? Because that is the final equivalent of nuclear ruin. Right?
I mean, that is really a serious matter. Can she do anything
short of that?
Joe, what do you think? She has remonstrated with the
witness. No, nothing is going to happen. Okay? The senior
partner is not going to bail her out of this. What is she going
to do?
MR. ZALUSKI: I was going to comment as Don did. Com-
ment 6 under [Model Rule] 3.3 40 has her disclosing to opposing
party and then to the court. I am not sure what else she can
do. I would assume at this point in time she cannot leave and
go see the president or the board of the company, practically
speaking. She must make some other disclosure.
MR. LEATHERS: She has got a real bad conflict herself now.
4'
She is caught up in all of this. Her partner has been caught up
I Comment [6] provides: "Except in the defense of a criminal accused, the rule
generally recognized is that, if necessary to rectify the situation, an advocate must
disclose the existence of the client's deception to the court or to the other party."
" MODEL RuLEs, Rule 1.7(b) provides:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of the client may
be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to
a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.
See also UNDawooD & FoTUNaE, supra note 1, § 14.3.5. [The Lawyer Targetj (1991
Supp.).
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as a witness. She is now caught up as almost a potential party
to, at least, some sorts of other proceedings. Going to the client
is one thing that the rules suggest. 42 We suggested that in this
time frame, there is not really very much she can do about that.
[Comment 6 to Model Rule 3.3] says: "[I]f necessary to
rectify the situation . . . ," having gone through the witness/
client scenario, "an advocate must disclose the existence of the
client's deception to the court"-and I like this-"or to the
other party."
Now, what difference do you see between disclosing to the
court and to the other party, Hank? What do you think about
that?
MR. GRADDY: I want to emphasize that I think the client
has gotten lost a little bit in this scenario. I think she has an
obligation. She is still representing the client and she has an
obligation to have a long and frank discussion with the client
about how to proceed. It may be that now is the time to cut a
deal with the opposing party. And I think the record needs to
be clarified, but it may be appropriate to go to the other side,
settle the case, clear the record and prepare for criminal conse-
quences.
MR. LEATHERS: The rule seems to me-the comments seem
ambiguous on that point. They say if withdrawal will rectify the
situation, then that can be done. If it will not, then you must
do other kinds of things, which would include to go to the court,
go to the other party. But let us distinguish between going to
the other party and going to the court.
Do you see any difference between those two remedies? What
about it, Don?
MR. VISH: I think, in the abstract, I can conceptualize some
circumstances where there would be a distinction, but I cannot
think of an example.
MR. LEATHERS: What bothers me about that, first of all, is
that in a sense in disclosing to the court, one is disclosing to the
• See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
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governmental authority that is responsible for the supervision of
this particular matter. That is different to me than going to the
other party and saying it. Does anybody else-what do you
think, Frank?
MR. DICKERSON: I agree with that. It would be less offen-
sive to me, I think, to disclose it to the court and kind of dump
it on the court and let the court resolve the issue. And, in so
doing, you steer away from the brink of any kind of adverse
representation of your client. I think you can just take that out
of this whole scenario, this whole picture. Then there is nothing
to question the misrepresentation of your client. You have gone
to the court and the court is going to decide the issue, which
takes the burden off of you. I would feel more comfortable with
that.
MR. LEATHERS: Yes, I was curious about that part of the
comment, about disclosing it to the opposing party. I think
probably I would feel more comfortable with disclosing it to the
court, under those circumstances. It has a little bit too much of
a disclosure of confidential information dimension to it, to me,
to simply do it with the other party. To the court-and clearly
under the rule requiring you to do something-that appeals to
me more than disclosing to the other party.
Fitz?
MR. FITZGERALD: I think there is also, while it tends to get
lost in the adversary process, that there was an independent
obligation that there has been a fraud perpetrated on the court,
I mean on the system. And I think there is an independent
obligation of candor to the court that you have to disclose. You
know, merely brushing it under the rug and settling it between
the parties does not cure the fact that the system itself has been
violated. And I am not sure-I cannot envision a circumstance,
other than possibly before the fact, of where you could withdraw
or just notify the opposing counsel once the fraud has occurred
in which perjury has been committed, I think you have an
obligation that arises independently under this rule to disclose it
to the court.
MR. DICKERSON: That is a good point. If you had just gone
to the party, that may generate a resolution of the whole case.
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But if the Judge is sitting there, the fraud has still been perpe-
trated on the court and you have not rectified that. And so I
think if you go to the other party, you are still under an
obligation, assuming that the court is not going to be advised.
You would still be under an obligation to disclose it to the court.
MR. STIGGER: John, it seems to me that once you go to the
court-now, I think, you would certainly need to go to the court
before this matter is disposed of-but once you go to the court
with that perjured testimony, then I think the court is almost
obligated to declare a mistrial right then and there.
4 3
MR. LEATHERS: It would be hard to imagine how they could
not.
MR. STIGGER: And your lawsuit is over. Now, you may have
some-there may be something to be gained by going to the
opposing counsel and saying, "Hey, we've just found out that
there's been perjured testimony and here's what it was. Based
upon that, is there some way we can resolve this thing and settle
this thing?" And, then, if you do settle it, you are still under
an obligation, I believe, to go to the court and make the court
aware of the perjured testimony.
MR. LEATHERS: What happens in the movie, for a dramatic
conclusion, is this young woman does not do any of those things.
Mid-level partner gets off the witness stand. They have hit a
home run and they figure that they have "slam dunked" the
scientist. He has not only been discredited by her cross, but by
the direct evidence of the mid-level partner and everything is
great, except the plaintiffs' lawyer now calls, as a witness, an
accountant. The accountant is the guy who did the analysis for
the finances of what it would cost to move the gas tank. He is
an independent person who knows that the report existed and
he knows the contents of the report and he knows to whom it
" Compare MODEL RULES, Rule 3.3, Comment [11]. Comment [11l provides:
If there is an issue whether the client has committed perjury, the lawyer
cannot represent the client in resolution of the issue and a mistrial may be
unavoidable. An unscrupulous client might in this way attempt to produce
a series of mistrials and thus escape prosecution. However, a second such
encounter could be construed as a deliberate abuse of the right to counsel
and as such a waiver of the right to further representation.
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was circulated. He had been on a witness list with 5,000 other
names that the plaintiff had submitted. They call him. They put
him on the witness stand and he now says, "Yes, there was such
a memo and yes, I saw it. It said such-and-such and it went to
such-and-such." Everybody now realizes that they have just
heard perjured testimony and that the document probably has
been destroyed.
And at this particular point in time, the judge calls a con-
ference in chambers, whereupon senior counsel, in chambers,
moves for a mistrial. On what grounds? Can you guess, Hank?
MR. GRADDY: Well, he asserts that there is perjured testi-
mony.
MR. LEATHERS: Unfortunately, he offered it.
MR. GRADDY: Right, but that his client will not get a fair
trial. So he asks for a mistrial in order for his client to get a
fair trial.
MR. LEATHERS: No. His motion for a mistrial was based
on the testimony of the accountant. Why? Because it is obvious
to him that if the plaintiff has called the accountant, somebody
leaked them the information of the collateral source on the
document. And, indeed, it is the young woman on the defense
team who did leak this to plaintiffs' counsel. That is how they
knew to get the guy on the witness stand. Now, what ethical
violation does that raise for the young woman who is defense
counsel? How about it? What do you think, Joe?
MR. ZALUSKI: Well, she has obviously over and over and
over again violated the rules, the discovery rules, and any rule
I can think of, I suspect. Her obligation at this point-he has
moved for a mistrial. I would assume that she would certainly
not argue against the motion.
MR. LEATHERS: This is the senior partner in her firm that
says, "We've got to get a mistrial. She leaked that information.
That is the only way they could possibly have known it." And,
indeed, that is the truth as plaintiffs' lawyer readily admits. You
[the senior partner] destroyed the document and she cured it by
disclosing something else to me [the plaintiffs' lawyer]. She did
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not tell me the document has been destroyed, but she did say,
"Maybe you ought to talk to so-and-so," and gives them the
name. What is that? That is why, a minute ago, I was focusing
on her possibility of curing by disclosing to the other side.
Remember the section of rules that I commented on, that one
thing you could do to cure was not just to disclose to the court,
but disclose to the other side? She chose to disclose something
to the other side that ultimately would let them save themselves
from the dilemma that they otherwise had. Has she disclosed
confidential information? Has she breached her duty of confi-
dentiality under the rules to her client?"
MR. ZALUSKI: I do not think so. It was certainly subject to
the original request for production. She produced it. I am not
sure she breached confidentiality. They asked for it and she
knew where it was and she gave it to them, maybe not in the
proper way, but she only did it after middle and senior man-
agement put this scheme together to keep the other side from
getting it. I assume that is when she gave it to them, after she
found out that it was not in the stack or in the U-Haul.
MR. LEATHERS: Apparently so.
MR. ZALUSKI: I do not know that she has breached confi-
dentiality. I am not sure that is a charge-
MR. LEATHERS: What do you think, Fitz?
- Compare Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir.
1974); MODEL RuLas, Rule 1.6(b)(2), which states:
A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary... to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the
lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a
defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon
conduct in which the client was involved or to respond to allegations in
any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
See also MODEL Ru_.ss, Rule 1.6, Comment [151, which states:
After withdrawal the lawyer is required to refrain from making disclosure
of the clients' confidences, except as otherwise provided in Rule 1.6.
Neither this Rule nor Rule 1.8(b) nor Rule 1.16(d) prevents the lawyer
from giving notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer may also
withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like.
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MR. FITZGERALD: Well, if you look at Rule 1.6 that talks
about confidentiality, 4 if that were the only rule governing the
situation, then, the disclosure would have been premature, be-
cause at some point in the process, there would potentially be a
controversy-if the perjury were to come out, there would be a
potential controversy between the client and attorney. Then, at
that point, you can use information in order to establish a
defense. But 1.6 is not the only thing that applies here, because
there is authority under, I think it is Rule 3.3, that allows you
to take reasonable remedial measures."4
MR. LEATHERS: Was this a reasonable remedial measure?
MR. FITZGERALD: Apparently the disclosure accomplished
the purpose where the disclosure to the other side, as opposed
to the court, which we discussed earlier, is authorized; a some-
what sagacious way of getting this information.
MR. LEATHERS: Yes. Does anybody have a problem with
that, the sagacious fashion of that? Rather than facing up to it
directly from the outset, "There has been a document de-
stroyed," in essence, she has found a way, her own way, to cure
it. And she has wired around, never facing it directly until this
dramatic moment in the courtroom.
MR. STIGGER: Well, she sure is not expediting the litigation.
MR LEATHERS: That is well taken. All this has cost a terrific
amount of money to get down to this point. Well, what is the
judge's ruling on the motion for a mistrial? He says to senior
counsel, "No, you're not getting a mistrial. I suggest that you
sit down and try to settle this case and save whatever is left of
your reputation and your client's business." Whereupon, they
get drilled for $100 million in this scenario. And, indeed, that
' MODEL RuLm , Rule 1.6(a) provides: "A lawyer shall not reveal information
relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except
for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representa-
tion .. "
4 MODEL Ru., Rule 3.3(a)(4) provides: "A lawyer shall not knowingly offer
evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence
and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures."
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is very close to the kind of result, if you know, that happened
in the Pinto litigation.
4 7
Well, I thought that the movie presented, really, significant
problems, ethically, as you watched the thing. And it was so
similar to the second problem that I had prepared, already,
which, in an environmental context, dealt with getting reports
that were unfavorable or getting a report that sounded like it
was going to be unfavorable, and saying to a witness, "No,
don't tell me any more. I don't want to know any more."
Destroying memos, offering perjured evidence-I thought the
movie maybe was a little bit better scenario for us to put for-
ward.
III. HYPOTHETICAL ETHICS PROBLEMS ARISING IN
ENVIRONMENTAL PRACTICE
Let us take up now with the problems that I actually did
prepare for this morning in which I try to raise some of the
ethical issues, primarily in the context of CERCLA [Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act)," Superfund, 49 and RCRA [Resource Conservation Recov-
ery Act]50 litigation. And as I talked to other lawyers here in
town who do that sort of work, what I was struck by is that
the most common question that they were always asking me had
to do with conflicts of interest. And so the first problem is
designed to raise significant problems of conflict of interest in
CERCLA context.
I noticed the other day on a circulation list of the PRPs5 l
up at Maxie Flats, 52 there were something like 550 or 600 poten-
tially responsible parties at Maxie Flats. And, obviously, when
11 See supra note 3.
48 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (1982), amended by Superfund Amendments and Reau-
thorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613-1782 (1986) (codified
throughout 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
49 Id.
so 16 U.S.C. §§ 3411-3473 (1981).
' A PRP is a potentially responsible party.
12 Maxie Flats is a Superfund site located in Fleming County, Ky. There are
currently 3 separate actions pending regarding Maxie Flats in Federal District Court,
Frankfort Division. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Dept. of Natural Resources and En-
vironmental Protection Cabinet v. U.S. Ecology Inc., No. 88-55 (E.D.Ky. filed June 30,
1988); U.S. Ecology Inc. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Dept. of Natural Resources
and Environmental Protection Cabinet, No. 88-56 (E.D.Ky. filed June 30, 1988); U.S.
Ecology Inc. v. Bradley, No. 88-72 (E.D.Ky. filed August 29, 1988).
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you have that number of potentially responsible parties, there
just are not many lawyers around who do that kind of work.
And so there is going to be a tendency for one law firm or one
lawyer to want to, at least, represent more than one of the
parties.
The first scenario that we have here to put forward today is
Superfund litigation relating to [the hypothetical] Blackacre. They
have a hazardous waste site there, hazardous substances in-
volved. We have an Owner. We have Generators One, Two and
Three. We have Transporters One and Two. And in this partic-
ular context, we take up with the government out to enforce the
Superfund obligations against the potential responsible parties
at this site. You represent Owner, already, in corporate kinds
of business. Can you represent the Owner in this Superfund
litigation?
Don, what do you think about that?
MR. VISH: I would not do it.
MR. LEATHERS: Why not?
MR. VISH: I think there is a good possibility for conflicting
interests to develop and I think that is foreseeable.
MR. LEATHERS: At this point, the bare question: Just Owner,
nobody else. You already represent them on corporate business.
What conflict do you see if you represent them on the Superfund
part of this?
MR. VISH: Well, the conflict with the corporation.
MR. LEATHERS: All right. Explain how that would work.
MR. VISH: Well, the duty to the corporation runs to it as an
entity, as a whole,53 which is different from the Owner of the
site. The penalties or the liabilities are different for each. And
I think there may be even the possibility of indemnity or of
cross claims that could arise.s
4
" MODEL RULES, Rule 1.13(a) provides: "A lawyer employed or retained by any
organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents."
' MODEL RUtES, Rule 1.7(a) and (b), and Comments [7]-191 [Conflicts in Litiga-
tion].
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MR. LEATHERS: Given your prior representation of the cor-
poration on corporate sorts of matters, do you feel that that
potentially presents a conflict, then, in the handling of these
liability issues at this phase of litigation?
MR. VISH: I think if you limit the laboratory and you limit
the universe, to that scenario, no.
MR. LEATHERS: What about competence? Assume your cor-
porate law firm does not do any Superfund litigation. Do you
take it then?
MR. VISH: No.
MR. LEATHERS: Why not? What are the considerations in
whether or not to take it? The first consideration for every law
firm: The Owner is your corporate client, ongoing business. If
you walk them out the door to be serviced by somebody else on
this litigation, what may happen? You may lose them as a client.
Is that everybody's first consideration? Long-standing relation-
ship; you do not want to damage that. By the same token,
handling anything for an existing paying client is always a fee
generator. So what is the countervailing consideration? What do
you think?
Hank?
MR. GRADDY: Well, Rule 1.1 governs and it does provide in
comment four an opportunity for a lawyer to accept represen-
tation where the lawyer believes that the requisite level of com-
petence can be achieved by reasonable preparation.55 And I think
this law firm-or we, or I need to make a decision about whether
that opportunity permits me to accept the representation. But
assuming that it is a specialized area of the law and outside of
my expertise, the first obligation is client representation, pursu-
ant to Rule 1.1, and putting him in the hands of somebody who
knows what he is doing.
MR. LEATHERS: Okay. So you have a duty to competently
represent your client and this is not in your normal bailiwick. It
" MODEL RuLEs, Rule 1.1 Comment [4] provides: "A lawyer may accept represen-
tation where the requisite level of competence can be achieved by reasonable preparation.




is easily solved inside a big law firm if they do a variety of
things. You just get another lawyer in the firm involved. Let us
take a smaller law firm and you do not normally do this kind
of business. Do you turn down that business and send that client
to someone else, hoping that they will still be your client when
it is all over? What do you think about that, Skip?
MR. STIGGER: John, I think the practical answer to that is,
if you are a small law firm, such as we are down in Henderson,
rather than turn them completely loose to another law firm, you
say: Hey, I want to associate another lawyer with "XYZ" law
firm in town. He has expertise in this area and he has handled
two cases like that. I will make sure that he treats you fairly on
the fee.
MR. LEATHERS: Keeps you always in the loop between...
the client and the other lawyer who is going to be doing this,
hoping to maintain control of this. Now, one thing you said,
Skip, was, "I will make sure he treats you okay on the fee."
What do you mean by that?
MR. STIGGER: When I am involved in a situation like that,
whether I am associating another lawyer or I have been associ-
ated, then it has been my routine and my practice for my billing
to go to the lawyer who associated me, to go ahead and approve
that bill as far as the hours that I have expended and the
reasonableness of that fee and then submit it to the client. That
is the way I prefer to do it.
MR. LEATHERS: So you have an obligation to be competent.
You have an obligation to provide a reasonable fee in these
particular circumstances. And one of the things I think Skip is
getting at is that by associating another lawyer and keeping
yourself in the loop, you may be doubling up in some points on
the fees.16 And clients are becoming increasingly resistant, cer-
tainly, to legal fees and increasingly conscious of legal fees. So
that, even apart from the duty you have for a reasonable fee,
you have to keep that in mind. What solution could you have
- Compare MODEL Rut s. Rule 1.5(e)(3). "A division of fee between lawyers who
are not in the same firm may be made only if... the total fee is reasonable."
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in that regard? How are you going to keep the fee reasonable?
What do you think about that, Joe?
MR. ZALUSKI: Again, I agree this is the way to do it, by
your association. You would certainly agree that you will do
some of the work yourself, whatever your firm is competent to
do. But your comment, though, I think is a good one. We see
a lot, too, where a client is saying, "I'm not paying to educate
you. I'm paying you to represent me and I'm not going to pay
a second or a third firm, not to simply tag along." So I think
it is more and more a very difficult matter to handle. You can
certainly agree to reduce your rate with your co-counsel, with
someone at depositions or trial or whatever else, but I think it
all has to be done. I think it would all have to be done in
writing with your client: "We've associated with so-and-so.
You've been our client for 20 years; we'll take care of you."
And, as he said, clients usually like that, but I think they are
very sensitive to paying two lawyers to go do the same thing,
very sensitive.
MR. LEATHERS: Yes. I think what you might consider doing,
since what you are talking about here is normal counsel and you
are trying to protect that relationship, is light loading your own
fee, eating a certain amount of your own fee or maybe even
nearly all of it in order to maintain that particular relationship.
I think most people's billing systems... can deal with that sort
of thing. Everybody in our business knows that . . . an estab-
lished corporate client base is the key to a good, ongoing prac-
tice. There are ways to write off time you spend doing CLE
work and other kinds of things. There might be a place, as well,
to write off a particular portion of the fee. Thus, you are
maintained ... in the attorney-client relationship while, at the
same time, seeing to it that your client is . . . competently rep-
resented at a reasonable fee. You can control that if you are in
the loop.
One of the things that I sometimes do as well, when fees are
not going to be very high from the other lawyer ... I have them
bill me. I pay those fees as an expense item. And I, then, bill
my client directly. Thus, the other lawyers never get in the habit
of billing anybody other than me.




MR. LEATHERS: That is correct.
MR. STIGGER: Okay.
MR. LEATHERS: I do not even charge for the time it takes
to do the bill. Let us take up the problem of the Owner. To the
Owner, you say, "Yeah, okay. We're a big law firm and we do
Superfund stuff. I will get another partner in the office and we
will do this kind of stuff for you." And the partner says, "Well,
yeah, but you know, Generators One, Two and Three and
Transporters One and Two have been to see me as well." Can
you represent the Owner and those other people at the site as
well? Now, what do you think under those circumstances, Fitz?
You are on the other side, I guess, as someone said. You see
people representing multiple clients, don't you?
MR. FITZGERALD: Somewhat. Although I have never done
it, the closest I ever came was when I was working in legal aid
and would end up with both sides in a divorce. And, of course,
the cardinal rule is that there is no such thing as uncontested
divorce unless one of the parties is deaf.
MR. FITZGERALD: And I think it is similar in this context:
the potential for direct adversity of interest is so high in this
circumstance that you are letting yourself in for significant head-
aches. Even if you could get the consent of all the parties, there
are circumstances where, because of their lack of legal acumen,
there is no informed consent that can be given. You may not
even be able to give them all the information they need to make
an informed judgment about whether you represent all their
interests, because you are having to pigeonhole what you know
about one party and another. 7 Under the CERCLA scenario,
they're all jointly and severally liable. So whatever you do that
helps to exculpate party "A" necessarily implicates party "B"
when it comes to apportionment. So I think, you know, the
standard is adversity of interest. In certain circumstances, you
can get the consent of the parties to representation of the same
" See MODEL RULES, Rule 1.7, Comment [5] [Consultation and Consent]; RESTATE-
MENT OF THE LAW GOVERNINO LAWYERS §§ 202 and 209 (Tentative Draft No. 4, April
10, 1991).
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issue where there are adverse interests. But, in this one, I would
not touch it."8
MR. LEATHERS: Well, let us make it a little more concrete
in terms of the various choices that you might have. Let us
suppose, for instance that you want to represent a Transporter
who did not transport for the Generator for whom you also
would be involved; does that make a difference? What do you
think under those circumstances, Don?
MR. VISH: I still would not take it, John. I think the potential
is there for conflict of interest.
MR. LEATHERS: Do you think it is worse if you picked up
the Transporter who did transport for your Generators?
MR. VISH: Yes.
MR. LEATHERS: How come? Why would you say that?
MR. VISH: Well, I think to do an adequate job, you would
have to have the freedom to explore any discovery of all the
various acts. I think you would have to have the unfettered
ability to discover intentional wrongdoing and-
MR. LEATHERS: Falsification of records and documents?
MR. VISH: Exactly. Once you agree to represent both, you
have a chilling effect on your ability to fully develop every
conceivable type of defense.59
MR. LEATHERS: Now, Joe, does your firm not, from time
to time, represent multiple parties in the Superfund litigation?
Do you have multiple PRPs?
MR. ZALUSKI: We do. This is one of the things I wanted to
comment on. This is, I think the knottiest problem: this partic-
ular type of litigation lends itself to these potential conflicts
more than anything else, I think. We do-because the size of
See A.B.A. Informal Op. 1495 (1982).
"See UNDERWOOD & FORTUNE supra note 1, at § 3.5.3.
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the defendants' group is typically ten to 20 to 50 and 500, we
do it-we do it with written waivers. I can tell you that I still
sometimes feel very uncomfortable because, obviously, in these,
typically in Superfund litigation, there is not much in the way
of defense that, "I didn't do it." It is almost strict-it is strict
liability. The only argument is how much you pay and whether
the Owner has a cap at, say, 25 percent in the case. Such a cap
implies that you can get away with something less than 25
percent. You can do that if the Transporter or Generator pays
a little bit more because they pay their caps. So I think what
you are doing in these litigations, typically, is negotiation of the
dollar amount. And such negotiation is very difficult unless there
is a de minimis party in there.... Typically, John, that is how
we do it. We represent a major Generator or Owner as a de
minimis party. The de minimis parties are a little bit different
because they can cash out. But, still, we require a written consent
in all cases.
Fitz's comment is a good one, too, though. I think that it
is our belief that our clients understand when we explain to them
the significance of the conflict and the legal aspect of the con-
flict. . . . I am not sure that they really appreciate the kinds of
problems you can get into on down the road.
MR. LEATHERS: Given that the liability under Superfund is
joint and several, the theory is that even a real de minimis
person could be held liable, I take it, . . . for the entirety of the
response cause, do you see that kind of litigation breaking into
cross-claims? Is it common to have actions for indemnification
filed subsequently? Do third party complaints occur from time
to time as other PRPs get dragged in that might have been
omitted? How do you see that as fitting into the conflicts that
are involved in this?
MR. ZALUSKI: Well, there is no question that everything you
said does happen. These are very real situations, not pieces of
law school hypotheticals. And because of all that, I think it is
very difficult to counsel with your client early on. You have the
Owner and Generator coming to you on day one. You really do
not know what is going to develop three months or a year down
the line. The Generator may have gone. That may entitle the
operator or the Owner to a lesser piece of the pie. So I think it
is very difficult to convey every scenario to these people and
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have them knowingly waive any conflict. But all those things,
cross-claims, counterclaims, burying documents, do happen.
Those are very real situations in Superfund litigation. Also, it is
big dollars.
MR. LEATHERS: As I look at this, I distinguish it from a lot
of massive litigation where you have multiple defendants and
you could have a defense team on one side that wants to contend
"X", that there is no liability. As I view this, both as an outsider
and as someone who has not done such litigation in a long time,
it looks to me as though the government has everybody on the
hook, for starters. It is strict liability and it is joint and several
[liability]. Once you round up all the suspects, from there on,
it is up to the suspects to determine who is going to have what
happen to them. The government does, in fact, settle with some
people but, as I understand it, most allocation of liability occurs
internally.
Is that correct, Joe?
MR. ZALUSKI: That is correct. I do not mean to offer my
own problem, but I will set this problem maybe for Rick. A
situation we found ourselves in recently was that in conducting
discovery for third-party defendants, we found that on our list,
a list suggested by one of our co-defendants, one of our major
clients had not had discovery taken. It was believed they were a
contributor. It put us in a very awkward position of what to do
then. Do you participate in the deposition? And you have a real
problem with consent in an adversarial situation. Having come
to you for representation in advance, you have sued them. And
now, have you sued yourself out of representing your first client?
It is a very difficult and awkward problem.
MR. LEATHERS: Joe, do you see those things shifting as the
litigation goes on? Do you monitor the litigation for develop-
ments that might change your conflict of interest situation from
what you originally contemplated?
MR. ZALUSKI: Yes. I think it is a real disservice, though, to
the client that brought you in for a piece of very expensive
litigation. And all of a sudden, in the scenario I just gave you,
your client has spent six figures for you to represent him in
litigation. All of a sudden now you have sued one of your own
clients or the group has sued one of your own clients. And you
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have to go to your client and say, "I may have to step down."
The client has to employ new counsel. There are not many people
around who do it, as you said earlier. And all the money he has
spent may have in fact gone ... down the toilet, to use a
technical term.
MR. LEATHERS: They, obviously, are not going to be happy
about that in terms of future representations ... nor is your
client, whom you have helped to uncover, going to be happy
about that, I take it, as well.
MR. ZALUSKI: Right-a very difficult situation.
MR. LEATHERS: Let us take the situation in which what you
do is choose to go the route of waivers. What kinds of infor-
mation have to go in the waivers? What kinds of discussions do
you have to have in order to get waivers in this sort of situa-
tion?6° What do you think about that, Hank?
MR. GRADDY: Well, I am going to beg off a little bit because
I am not in Joe's position, frankly, to hammer out these waivers.
My inclination in reading the problem was to avoid it by rec-
ognizing up front that there would not be a situation where a
waiver would be adequate to protect against potential adverse
effects on clients. Now, in one situation, I was willing to say
that Transporter Two and Transporter One might be represented
by the same attorney under the theory that their stream of waste
does not interrelate to each other. Thus both of them would be
looking back at the Generator saying, "We were given false
information." I am not sure I can fashion a waiver that I would
feel very comfortable with. My call is that everybody is fighting
everybody and everybody needs independent counsel.
MR. LEATHERS: The clear solution, I guess, from the point
of view of the defendants who are involved in something like
this is, in an ideal world, everybody would truly have independ-
ent counsel. But, as a practical matter, that may not be available.
If you take into consideration the limited number of attorneys
who are available to do this particular kind of work, some clients
are going to be with raw beginners. Conversely, some people are
I See UNDERWOOD & FORTUNE supra note 1, at §§ 3.7.1 and 3.7.2.
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going to have to be doubled up. From the viewpoint of the law
firms, obviously, it is a money generator to have more clients
involved in it. Can you help at all by representing multiple
defendants and sharing some of the litigation costs? Does that
benefit them? Is that a factor in considering whether or not to
represent multiple defendants? If so, are there any things inter-
nally that you can do to make this better?
I have given you a scenario, Joe, in which you represent
four or five of these people. How about the situation in which
you parcel it out? George represents one and Vanessa represents
somebody else; and everybody is picking a defendant. And as
the attorneys, we all agree that we are not going to talk to each
other. And you build a Chinese Wall. And two of you will stay
in Frankfort and there will be others in Lexington. Does that
add or detract from this thing? What do you think? What about
the use of a Chinese Wall internally in the law firm? You have
gotten waivers that say Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs can represent
everybody. Internally, do you think you make things better or
worse by having a Chinese Wall?
MR. ZALUSKI: Well, we do build the Wall. It is amusing,
though, when, you know, George walks into the middle office
and Vanessa walks into the middle office to compromise on an
issue with respect to their clients. So, still, even though you have
that separation, you still come to a point where you are repre-
senting your client as best you can. I think the clients expect
that the Wall exists. I do not think they understand what it is
fully, but it is the only way we can make it function. Vanessa
certainly could not have access to George's files, such as what
his client has located when, in what volume, in what toxicity,
and all of those things that go into allocations. But, by the same
token, when they begin bartering and trading off and seeing if
they can settle up the allocation, information comes out, prob-
ably through awkward discovery. Then we have counsel in the
same law firm representing the taker and the giver of the dep-
osition, and we just came from the same office. Those are very
awkward situations, but that is the only way that we find we
can do it.




MR. ZALUSKI: I think Vanessa is really good at that. On
behalf of your clients, yes. I mean, you have to conduct yourself,
I believe, as if that is your only client.
MR. LEATHERS: What do you think about that, Rick? Does
that solve anything in conflicts of interest?
MR. UNDERWOOD: Well, this is a very practical problem. I
get questions like this from time to time. My feeling is that I
am probably more conservative than many and I can afford to
be. My usual response to these kind of things as the Chairman
of the Ethics Committee is, since I cannot decide the factual
matters and make a judgment for the lawyer, I do not want to
relieve them of the burden of making the judgment. Then I
schmooze with them, but I do not give them opinions, positive
or negative, unless it is clear. I think the Chinese Wall clearly
is available in the limited circumstances of a former client con-
flict situation. It is not approved under the rules, but the Sixth
Circuit has approved it in that context. 61 But my problem with
it in the present client conflict is that it does not solve the loyalty
problems. 62
And going back to the waivers, too, I mean-I am not
casting any stones or anything else. I just think it is extremely
difficult. I think, though, that the Chinese Wall has a place in
the sense that while it will not solve conflicts, it might facilitate
obtaining the informed consent of the client. Thus the Wall
might be useful in that sense. What I am saying is, the mere
fact that you have a Wall will not protect you from discipline,
a malpractice suit, or disqualification, because someone else
might not be satisfied. But it is not out of the question to use
it to facilitate the informed consent to clients.
MR. DICKERSON: What is the alternative? I guess, just to
not represent these people?
MR. UNDERWOOD: Yes.
MR. DICKERSON: Very difficult problem.
61 Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar & Allen, 849 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1988).
6 UNDERWOOD & FoRnuN supra note 1, at § 3.8.4. See also Manning, 849 F.2d
at 228 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
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MR. UNDERWOOD: Yeah, I think that is the problem.
MR. LEATHERS: You know, one of the things I think that
has to be considered is that the ramifications of this problem
actually go beyond just the ethical rules which might cause you
problems with the bar association. One must also consider what,
if any, liability problems your firm may have as a result of
conflicts of interest. For example, one of these Generators gets
a worse deal than he thinks he would have gotten had he had
independent counsel. He then sues you for malpractice and for
not adequately representing his interest. Now you have that
problem and that is a downstream liability problem for every-
body as well. What do you think about it? Really, I do not
believe there is anything that you can do that would constitute
a waiver or protection against malpractice possibilities down the
road. You cannot make a client agree to that, can you?
MR. UNDERWOOD: Well, of course, informed consent, the
client-all these clients always turn on their lawyer after the fact.
That is what I tell my students, "Don't cut them too close,
because they're always the first person to turn on you." There
is an old "poem" on the back of an A.B.A. Journal in the
criminal context. Often these days, even when you're advising
so-called sophisticated clients, you ought to think about it. It
goes something like, "When I get back on the street, there's one
man whose ass I'll beat, my lawyer." They're going to turn on
you. But, by the same token, if they sue you for malpractice,
they have to have acted reasonably, too. The jury or the deci-
sion-maker can judge your conduct in light of the circumstances.
I think there are circumstances in which there can be consent.
I think what you have to do with the client is to discuss the very
things we are discussing. I doubt if very many people go into
that amount of detail. It's hard to see them all coming. And
while the Chinese Wall can be useful to you to get consent, it
is not garlic before the vampire. It is not going to give you that
degree of protection.
MR. LEATHERS: I guess one of the questions, as well, that
I would point out, is that you get into a situation where there
arguably is a conflict of interest and you solved it internally with
waivers or whatever. You have considerations from the stand-
point of bar discipline. You have considerations with regard to
malpractice. You also have to consider whether or not the other
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party involved in the litigation may turn that conflict of interest
into grounds for disqualifying you. I have always had real prob-
lems with the notion that opposing parties could try to disqualify
somebody because they have a conflict of interest. Obviously, if
the argument is that I try to disqualify Cal Rozelle because he
is adverse to somebody who used to be his client and that is my
client in this litigation, that is one thing. But you will see
circumstances in which it is almost like a vicious inner member.
I see that Cal Rozelle's involved in a piece of litigation. I
represent somebody who has never had any contact in the world
with him, but I move to disqualify him, because I think he has
a conflict with somebody else. I really do not understand why
the rules provide this. For example, the final comment to Rule
1.7 is that in some circumstances, even an opposing party can
raise conflict of interest, as I recall, where the conflict is clearly
to call into question an affair or a deficiency in administration
of justice.63 What you are saying is, that somehow this is such
an affront to the system of justice that I can call into question
his representation of someone with whom I have no connection
in the world.6" The comment cautions that you have to be
careful, because it will turn into harassment, satellite litigation,
this type of thing. But that is one of the things that you have
to be conscious of, as well.
So in looking at those conflicting situations, I see a lot of
ramifications to be solved and consideration to be given as to
how it is that you are going to go about this. Tom?
MR. FITZGERALD: Well, two minor points: one is the pos-
sibility of limiting your scope of representation. If you have
multiple clients with both of their defenses as, "We did not do
it," or they are asserting one of the defenses before you get to
apportionment, there may be circumstances where you can limit
the scope of representation to avoid the conflicts, although that
is sometimes less efficient for the client.65 If they go in and they
" MODEL RtnS, Rule 1.7, Comment [151 provides: "Where the conflict is such
as clearly to call in question the fair or efficient administration of justice, opposing
counsel may properly raise the question."
- For one approach to this issue, see In re Appeal of Infotechnology, Inc., 582
A.2d 215 (S.Ct.Del. 1990), which is discussed in Tuite, Ethics: Both Sides Now, A.B.A.
J. 92 (June 1991).
11 See MODEL RuLEs, Rule 1.2(c): "A lawyer may limit the objectives of the
representation if the client consents after consultation."
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lose that step, then they can go into the apportionment stage
and it will cost them more. The other point is where the lawyer
acts as intermediary. For example, if you have representations
of all of the de minimis parties and there is a common interest
and they understand the limitations, and that your representation
is not as an advocate but as an intermediary to attempt to
negotiate the resolution jointly, you may be able to structure it
to do that. And if there is a conflict and one of them becomes
dissatisfied, you have to bow out.66
MR. LEATHERS: Might you almost treat this as different
classes and that de minimis Generators, for instance, fall into
one class in which you could fairly represent them, but when
you get into a larger contributor of some sort, that that causes
a different problem? What do you think about that, Joe? I
think, when you were talking a minute ago, you said we repre-
sent one big Generator, maybe, and several de minimis parties.
MR. ZALUSKI: I think, though, that all these questions, John,
turn on the facts of the case. We are involved in one right now
where there are no records for anybody. If the Owner of the
site, the municipality, has no records, none of your Generators
or Transporters will have the records. So the standard formula
does not work. We do not know who is going to pay what. It
is almost like taking a dart board out and deciding what piece
you should get. In that case, everybody hates everybody. We
are all trying to keep our exposure at the lowest. Nobody can
discover of me what I took there and I cannot discover of them.
We all know it is toxic but we do not know how much we took.
So in a case where I think the EPA [Environmental Protection
Agency] guide is not going to work, i.e., de minimis, they are
going to get a piece. Owner/operators are going to get a multiple
of their Generators. It makes it a little bit easier. I think that is
a part of your disclosure to your client, that I can represent you
and your maximum exposure is blank under this document.
Also, I can also represent a de minimis character in the deal.
So it does make it a little bit easier, but it is pretty fact sensitive,
I think. That is something we have not talked about much, that
' MODEL Ruus, Rule 2.2(c) provides: "A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary




the facts could well dictate whether you can take on a second
or third party.
MR. LEATHERS: Let us take on a slightly different variant
of this. You represent, let us suppose, a Generator in some
regard, not related to this particular site. The Owner says to
you, "I want you to represent me. The Generators have lied.
That Generator lied about what was in that stuff that got put
on my place out there." Under those circumstances, can you
represent the Owner? Let us put it another way. Let us suppose
you turn down the Owner. You say, "No, I'm not going to
represent you. I've previously represented a Generator." Now,
the Generator says to you-remember, you did not represent
him on this project before, in any respect-"I want you to
represent me." You have heard from the Owner in the context
in which he was trying to retain you as his counsel, that he
believes the documents supplied by the Generator were false.
Can you represent the Generator under those circumstances? Or
has your consultation with the Owner already tainted you with
confidential information related to him to the point that you
cannot accept the employment? 67 What do you think about that,
Mr. Dickerson?
MR. DICKERSON: I think that strikes me as, there is this
competition between all the PRPs. Incidentally, if there are 832
PRPs, the competition exists. Of course, you can increase the
other fellow's liability and reduce yours. But a bald allegation
by an individual that somebody has falsified a certain kind of
transmittal document or something to the site, does not seem to
preclude you from going ahead and trying to conduct some kind
of investigation of your own to verify that. But that statement,
that allegation, in and of itself, is one of the defenses that you
raise typically. This is what Joe tries to do by finding out if
somebody falsified any documents and then, instead of being de
minimis, they may all of a sudden turn into a major player. So
the fact that the allegation has been made, does not automati-
cally let you out of the ball game at that point. I think you can
very well assume the representation of that individual. I am not
61 For valuable and practical guidance, see A.B.A. Comm. on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility Formal Op, 90-358 (1990).
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sure that you have any duty of not disclosing that fact, because
that is basically one of the primary arguments.
MR. LEATHERS: You always have that. So there is nothing
confidential you see in that particular scene or information?
MR. DICKERSON: No.
MR. LEATHERS: Let me close with this question and put it
on Vish. Let us suppose that you have been asked to be counsel
for the Generator and that you have already been corporate
counsel previously. I think you have said you see some conflict
between being corporate counsel and being counsel in a Super-
fund litigation. Does that make it worse if you have held a
corporate office of secretary, for instance? Does that give you
a problem about representing them in that particular matter?
MR. VISH: Yes, it does, because as an officer, you are not
only the alter ego of the client as counsel, but the client itself.
You are a participant in the actual affairs that are being litigated,
as opposed to mere disinterested counsel.
MR. LEATHERS: That may cause you a problem internally
for yourself. Would you think that it disqualifies your firm? I,
Don Vish, of Brown, Todd & Heyburn, am secretary of the
corporation, but should Brown, Todd represent the corporation
in this particular kind of litigation?
MR. VISH: Well, here is perhaps the only time that I think a
Chinese Wall is acceptable, when there is a current and ongoing
litigation. Like Rick, I have always regarded Chinese Walls as
useful for successive employment. But here is a case where I do
think that you could isolate effectively with the Chinese Wall. I
think that it would work.
MR. LEATHERS: Well, that concludes our time for today.
We did not get through all the problems that I prepared. You
might glance through those things. I tried in those to construct
a lot of questions that raised conflict of interest problems and
so forth. We thank you very much for being here. Thank you.
(SESSION CONCLUDED)
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